Smuggling Of Nuclear Material Essay -- essays research papers

Smuggling of Nuclear Material Over the past five years the former states of the Soviet Union haven't been able to prevent the leakage of nuclear material. Nuclear materials and technologies are more accessible now than at any other time in history, due to the breakup of the Soviet Union and the worsening of economic conditions. No longer does the Soviet KGB, the Soviet military and the Soviet border guards have the control to stop the smuggling of nuclear material's. With the Cold War being over, there is a huge stockpile of over 100 nuclear sites (See Appendix A). Russia, alone has an inventory of 1,300 tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU), and 165 tons of weapon usable plutonium. Such material is coming into high demand on the market. Terrorist, organized crime and countries with nuclear ambition, are high bid contenders for the material. The United States is also becoming involved for the safety of preventing a nuclear disaster. The U.S. has just begun their large task and with Russia's worsening economy, smuggling of nuclear material will continue.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  During the Cold War the security of Soviet nuclear weapons and missile materials was based on a highly centralized military system and operating within a strong political authority. The workers back then where well disciplined and each individual new his/her role. The workers were among the best treated and loyal to the Russian military. They are now suffering hardships and are forced to scavenge anything to pay for their food, rent and social services.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  A new trend is already occurring with some of the workers . There are those that will seek employment out of the nuclear field and in the commercial sector, where salaries are higher. Then the unfortunate who lose their jobs and find no work. The scarier thought is that the uncontempt people in Russia's nuclear complex with access to nuclear materials will sell themselves, to make a quick buck. Most suppliers of nuclear material, were insiders who had worked or were then working at nuclear research institutes or naval bases. Most perpetrators had no customers in hand but new that a quick profit existed (See Appendix B).   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  The first confirmed case involving the diversion of HEU occurred at the Luch Scientific Production Association in Podolsk. Between May and September of... ...;  Ã‚  Ã‚  The smuggling of nuclear material out of Russia has become proratable to the low income worker as well as to the benefit of terrorist, organism crime and nuclear research centers. There exist no security at most of the nuclear facilities and so apprehending the material is quit easy. More cases of unsuccessful attempts are becoming known to the media, but any successful attempts the government, both Russia and the U.S have decline to answer. If left unchecked it may even escalate to the complex level of drug smuggling. Work Cited List   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Thomas B. Cochran, Robert S. Norriss, Making the Russian Bomb: From Stalin to Yelsin, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  John Deutch,  ³The Threat of Nuclear Diversion Statement for Record, ² CIA, March 20, 1996.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Alexei Lebedev, in  ³Russian Weapons Plutonium Storage Termed Unsafe by Minatom Official, ² Nucleonics Week, April 28, 1994.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Weclliam C. Potter,  ³Arms Control Today, ² Monterey Institute of Internation Studies, October 1995. Paul Woessner,  ³Nuclear Material Trafficking: An Interim Assessment,  ³ Bridgeway